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Abstract
When potential beneficiaries share knowledge and attitudes about a policy inter-
vention, that can influence their decisions to participate and, in turn, change the effec-
tiveness of both the policy and its evaluation. This matters notably in integrated social
policies with several components. We examine neighborhood effects on the take-up of
the schooling subsidy component of the Progresa-Oportunidades program in Mexico.
We exploit random variations in the local densities of program beneficiaries generated
by the randomized evaluation. Higher program densities in areas of 5 km radius in-
crease the take-up of scholarships and enrollment at the junior-secondary level. These
neighborhood effects exclusively operate on households receiving another component
of the program, and do not carry over larger distances. While several tests reject het-
erogeneities in impacts due to spatial variations in implementation, we find suggestive
evidence that neighborhood effects stem partly from the sharing of information about
the program among eligible households.
Keywords: spatial externalities; peer effects; take-up of social policies; policy
evaluation; conditional cash transfers.
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1 Introduction
Demand-side schooling interventions have now become an important component of social
policies in developing countries. The available empirical evidence suggests that cash sub-
sidies in particular can have large effects on schooling decisions (e.g. Glewwe and Kremer
2006). These interventions have been found to be effective devices for encouraging the human
capital investments of poor households (e.g. Parker et al., 2008 and Fiszbein and Schady,
2009). Recent studies have documented that they can also induce, in beneficiary areas, a
set of non-market interactions that can further increase their effects (Angelucci et al., 2010,
Bobonis and Finan, 2009, and Lalive and Cattaneo, 2009). Social interactions affecting pref-
erences for investments in education and transfers within extended families have in particular
been posited and documented. However, there is still incomplete knowledge on the specific
networks within which those interactions occur and the specific mechanisms at play.
The sharing of knowledge and attitudes about the policy interventions among networks
of potential beneficiaries is one set of social interactions that remains under-documented in
the setting of social policies in developing countries. The role of information-sharing and
initial preferences and prejudices in determining program participation has been emphasized
in the context of social policies in the United States. For instance, Bertrand et al. (2000)
and Aizer and Currie (2004) find evidence of networks effects, i.e. correlations in program
take-up decisions within neighborhoods and ethnic groups. In the case of the Food Stamp
Program, Daponte et al. (1999) find that ignorance about the program contributes to non-
participation.
The conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs that have been implemented in developing
countries create many opportunities for information-sharing and attitudes-based interactions
between beneficiaries. These opportunities are likely to affect the take-up rates of schooling
subsidies and they are influenced by three types of factors that span both supply and demand
sides. First, in integrated social policies, cash subsidies for schooling tend to be associated
with complementary interventions for the provision of health care or support for better
nutrition. Beneficiaries do not necessarily participate in all the interventions, so that there
is an intensive margin for potential recipients to increase their participation in the program
by taking up more components. Second, the recipients of the transfers, notably women and
mothers, regularly encounter each other during program operations, for instance in meetings
of beneficiaries or during activities of complementary interventions, such as visits to health
centers. Third, the targeting of those interventions implies that participants often have
similar socioeconomic backgrounds and are thus likely to identify with each other (Akerlof,
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1997). Hence, the demand-side schooling interventions are likely both to enhance the existing
interactions among groups of beneficiaries, and to further shape those groups, thus producing
externalities that would not occur were individuals treated in isolation.
As with other mechanisms of social interactions, interactions based on sharing of infor-
mation about the policy intervention and attitudes can explain variations across areas and
groups in the take-up of schooling subsidies which do not stem from cost-benefit factors such
as the differences in the supply of schooling or the opportunity costs of schooling. However,
they depart from other interactional mechanisms because they take place among networks of
potential beneficiaries of the interventions. Interactions between potential beneficiaries have
different implications than other sorts of social interactions for the design and implemen-
tation of the interventions. The targeting of a program and the way it mobilizes potential
beneficiaries is particularly likely to affect the extent of those interactions and thus it is
crucial for its effectiveness.
In this paper, we examine the presence of neighborhood effects, in the form of social
interactions within networks of potential beneficiaries, affecting the take-up of the schooling
subsidy component of the Progresa-Oportunidades social program (see, e.g., Schultz, 2004,
and Parker et al., 2008). The program entails several unbundled components in addition to
the schooling subsidies, notably food stipends conditional on health checks. While the take-
up of the nutrition and health component is almost 100 percent, a large share of children
eligible for transfers for secondary schooling remain unenrolled.
The program targets poor households in small villages located in rural areas of Mexico,
and we base our analysis on the study of cross-village spatial externalities. Due to the high
level of program penetration and geographic targeting, the topography of the area covered
by the program consists of clusters of neighboring villages rather than isolated villages with a
high density of beneficiary communities within treated regions. In this context, beneficiaries
living in neighboring villages are likely to interact in several ways, and share information
on the program. To examine the effects of those interactions, we investigate the extent to
which variations in the local density of the program in areas surrounding beneficiary villages
influenced the take-up response of potential beneficiaries.
Spillovers have previously been examined in the context of Progresa - Oportunidades
by comparing the outcomes of ineligible and eligible households in the same villages us-
ing partial-population designs (Moffitt, 2001). Accordingly, Bobonis and Finan (2009) and
Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) have found evidence of spillovers through peer effects in school
enrollment, and Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), Angelucci et al. (2010) and Angelucci et al.
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(2012) evidence of transfers within both village and household-level networks.1 However, in
the Progresa-Oportunidades setting, because many beneficiary communities are very close
to each other, spillovers may occur not only within but also across villages.
To investigate the presence of neighborhood effects, we combine data from the experimen-
tal evaluation of the program with information on the geo-referenced locations of the villages
benefitting from it. We focus our analysis on the secondary school participation decisions of
program-eligible children, which is the primary short-run outcome of the intervention and
the key requirement associated with the largest component of the in-cash transfer.
We use a simple empirical framework that allows us to disentangle the effects of the
incentives resulting from the program eligibility of the household (and the village it resides
in) from the indirect effects arising from the local density of program recipients at the
level of areas surrounding targeted villages. Exploiting the randomized evaluation design
and the clustered spatial distribution of the villages in our sample, we causally identify
program externalities across neighboring villages. The allocation of evaluation localities
between the treatment and control group is random within each area surrounding villages.
These exogenous variations enable us to identify the spillovers induced by the density of
program delivery at any distance from the villages in our sample. Next, we investigate
whether externalities arise in this setting because of social interactions between program
beneficiaries, or other changes associated with variations in the local density of the program
across areas surrounding villages.
We find evidence of a positive and robust effect of the local density of participants in the
program on secondary school participation decisions: the presence of other potential benefi-
ciaries in nearby villages further increases the effect of the intervention. This neighborhood
effect is large, with a marginal effect of an additional treated village in the neighborhing
area of 2.7 percentage points on secondary school enrollment – to be compared with a di-
rect effect of own village treatment of 9.5 percentage points – and it is present only over
short distances (0–5 km) but vanish over larger radiuses (5–10 km). Crucially, these spatial
externalities appear to be concentrated among children from beneficiary households; there
is no evidence of such effects for children in the control group and for those in treated vil-
lages who are not eligible for the program. This remarkable heterogeneity sheds some light
on the mechanisms behind program externalities. Interactions within networks of potential
beneficiaries spanning across villages seem to have contributed to increase the take-up of
1Other recent examples from the literature include Duflo and Saez (2003) who examine the take-up of
retirement plans within academic departments, and Kuhn et al. (2011) who study spillover effects of lottery
winnings within Dutch postal codes.
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the educational component of the program and heighten its impacts on schooling. We argue
that, while interactions through preexisting social networks should affect all households that
share local resources, social interactions that are restricted to program beneficiaries are likely
to be associated with knowledge and attitudes toward the program. Accordingly, we find
that our variation in local treatment density is associated with increased knowledge, among
eligible households, about the different components of the program – notably the schooling
subsidies.
Some sorts of spatial variations in the delivery of the program among evaluation villages
could in principle explain the observed relationship between the local density of the treatment
and take-up of schooling subsidies. This may occur if, for instance, areas with more evalua-
tion villages benefited from more efficient program operations, or received larger investments
in supply infrastructure, thereby helping recipients comply with the schooling requirements
of the program. However, using direct measures of efficiency of program operations or in-
vestigating whether spillovers are apparent only within the administrative units that supply
social services, we find little support in the data for such implementation variations.
Our results thus provide evidence of the effects of the local density of treatment on the
take-up of the different components of social policies. We find suggestive evidence that
information-sharing among networks of beneficiaries is driving those effects. Our findings
confirm, in the context of a developing country, that social interactions associated with
higher treatment density can increase individual responses to a social policy.
Our findings also relate to other studies which have used experimental variations of treat-
ment density to identify the effects of spillovers of interventions (e.g. Miguel and Kremer,
2004, Banerjee et al., 2010, and Ichino and Schundeln, 2012). However, those studies were
conducted during small-scale interventions, and hence potentially miss important effects that
occur during the full-scale implementation of a program. 2. Our results shed light on those
scaling-up effects by examining spatial externalities in an experimental sample surveyed in
the midst of the implementation of the policy on a large scale.
2To partially overcome this issue, researchers have recently begun to inject experimental variations
directly into the intensity of spillover effects by varying the saturation of individuals treated within treated
clusters (e.g. Duflo and Saez (2003); Gine and Mansuri (2011); Crepon et al. (2013))
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2 Setting and Data
2.1 Program features
Initiated in 1997 and still in effect, Progresa-Oportunidades is a large-scale social program
that aims to foster the accumulation of human capital in the poorest communities of Mexico
by providing both cash and in-kind benefits, which are conditional on specific behaviors in
the key areas of health and education. It grants scholarships and school supplies to children
aged under 17, conditional on regular attendance of one of the four last grades of primary
schooling (grades 3 to 6) or one of the three grades of junior secondary schooling (grades 7 to
9). The scholarships increase in amount with school grade, and in grades 7 to 9 are larger for
girls than boys. The program also distributes cash transfers for the purchase of food, provides
food supplements, and promotes health care through free preventive education interventions
on hygiene and nutrition. The distribution of the food stipends and nutritional supplements
is conditional on health care visits at public clinics. The benefits are delivered to the female
head of the household (usually the mother) on a bimonthly basis after verification of each
family member’s attendance in the relevant facility.3
The Progresa program is targeted both at the village and household levels. During the
first years of the program, poor rural households were selected through a centralized process
which encompasses three main steps. First, villages were ranked by a composite index of
marginality, which was computed using information on socioeconomic characteristics and ac-
cess to the program infrastructures from the censuses of 1990 and 1995.4 Second, potentially
eligible localities were grouped based on geographical proximity, and relatively isolated com-
munities were excluded from the selection process. Third, eligible households were selected
using information on covariates of poverty obtained from a field census conducted in each
locality before its incorporation into the program.5
The program started in 1997 in 6,300 localities with about 300,000 beneficiary households,
3Overall cash transfer amounts can be substantial: the median benefits are 176 pesos per month (roughly
18 USD in 1998), equivalent to about 28 percent of the monthly income of beneficiary families.
4Localities with fewer than 50 or more than 2,500 inhabitants were excluded during the first years of
the program. We use the words “locality” and “village” interchangeably when referring to distinct census-
designated rural population clusters, i.e. settlements in which the inhabitants live in neighboring sets of
living quarters and that have a name and locally recognized status (including hamlets, villages, farms, and
other clusters). Rural localities (also called rural communities), or villages, are defined as having fewer than
2,500 inhabitants.
5A proxy-mean index was computed as a weighted average of household income (excluding children),
household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other physical characteristics of the dwelling.
Households were informed that their eligibility status would not change at least until November 1999, irre-
spective of any variation in household income.
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and expanded rapidly during the following years. In 1998, it was delivered to 34,400 localities
(1.6 million households), and in 1999, coverage increased to 48,700 localities (2.3 million
households). The expansion of the program continued in subsequent years both in rural and
urban areas.
An experimental evaluation of the program was conducted during this phase of geo-
graphical expansion in rural areas. A random sample of 506 villages was drawn from a set
of program-eligible localities situated in seven central states of Mexico (Guerrero, Hidalgo,
Queretaro, Michoacan, Puebla, San Luis de Potosi, and Veracruz). From those villages, 320
localities were randomly assigned to the treatment group and started receiving the program’s
benefits in March–April 1998; the remaining 186 formed the control group and were thus
prevented from receiving the program’s benefits until November 1999.
2.2 Partial take-up
Importantly for our purposes, the two transfer components are unbundled. Households
declared eligible to receive benefits can take up food stipends, scholarships, or both. They
can also choose to receive the scholarships for some but not all of their eligible children.
Beyond transfer amounts, take-up decisions largely depend on the tightness of the conditions
attached to each grant component. While nominally conditional, a substantial fraction of
the transfers is de facto unconditional. In particular, the conditions attached to the food
stipends and scholarships for primary school children do not seem to incur a high cost to
households, because school enrollment at that level is almost 100 percent. We used data from
the administration of the program on the distribution of the different transfers in the 320
treatment localities of the evaluation to document take-up. This data confirms the complete
take-up of the food stipends: at the end of 1998 and 1999, respectively 97.1 and 98.0 percent
of eligible households in those localities received the transfers.
In contrast, the conditionality of the scholarships at the secondary level is binding for
many households whose eligible school-age children would not have gone to school in the
absence of the program. The same data indicates that respectively 83.0 and 91.3 percent
of households eligible to a scholarship for at least one child enrolled at the primary or
secondary level receive one. But only 63.7 percent of kids who are eligible for a scholarship
for secondary-level school do attend school in 1998, and 61.9 percent of them do in 1999.
Hence, partial take-up of the program benefits is prevalent in this setting, whereby some
eligible households comply with the food stipend conditions but refrain from enrolling some
or all of their children in secondary schools. However, once they are incorporated into the
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program, recipients can further adjust their behaviors by enrolling some of their program-
eligible children. While take-up of the food transfers is almost complete, there is thus a
margin for increasing the take-up of the schooling component, which can be seen as an
intensive margin of program participation.
2.3 Village Neighborhoods
In this paper, we use the term of ’neighborhood’ for areas within a given radius around each
evaluation village. We borrow this terminology from a literature based mainly on urban
data, but in our contexts, ’neighborhood’ means areas or clusters of villages.
In order to characterize the local densities of the intervention (in the neighborhoods),
we combine information from the program administration, indicating which localities were
eligible for the program at the end of 1998 and 1999, with information from the 2000 popula-
tion census and the annual school census. The population census provides the geographical
coordinates (latitudes and longitudes) for the universe of rural localities, and the school cen-
sus the coordinates of all secondary schools. The geo-referenced data further allows us to
identify the locations of the evaluation localities.6
As in many rural regions of Latin America and elsewhere, the topography of the area
covered by the program consists of clusters of villages with a quasi-continuum of dwellings,
rather than isolated villages. On average, there are 22 localities with an overall population
of roughly 6,400 inhabitants within an area defined by a 5 km radius from each evaluation
village. This proximity favors the interactions between inhabitants of neighboring villages.
Turning now to the intervention, Figure 1 depicts the geographic scope of the Progresa
penetration during the first two years of program roll-out in the seven central states where
the evaluation took place. The rural localities targeted by the program in 1998 and 1999 are
shown in light and dark grey respectively, while treatment and control localities are reported
in red and blue. In order to provide a more in-depth depiction of the areas surrounding
evaluation villages, the map features a smaller-scale view of a region in the State of Michoacan
in which circles of 5 km radius are drawn around each evaluation village.
Both maps reveal that beneficiary and evaluation villages tend to be geographically clus-
tered – with more deprived areas featuring higher program density. Those patterns are
6We used official information on the listing of the universe of rural localities receiving the program
(broken down by each program component) at the closing of each fiscal year in 1998 and 1999 to verify
which localities were receiving the program in late 1998 and 1999. A fraction (about 20 percent) of control
localities started receiving the program’s food stipends by November 1999, but none of those villages had
received any scholarship by that date. We thus continue to treat those observations as belonging to the
control group in November 1999.
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confirmed by descriptive statistics of the areas surrounding the evaluation sample, which
are shown in Table 1. By the end of 1998, there are on average 10 program-beneficiary
localities within a neighborhood defined by a 5 km radius around each evaluation village.
Those localities have an average total population of 834 children aged 6 to 14, out of which in
average 386 (46 percent) receive scholarships from Progresa (column 1).7 Moreover, several
evaluation villages are indeed located very close together. Of the 506 evaluation localities,
139 (27 percent) have another evaluation locality within 5 km, 57 (11 percent) have two
such localities, and 16 (3 percent) have three or more. Thus 212 (41 percent) villages in the
experiment have other evaluation villages in a 5 km radius; our empirical analysis will iden-
tify the effects of cross-village externalities for these villages. The density of the program, as
captured by the numbers of both non-evaluation and evaluation beneficiary villages, roughly
doubles in areas with more marginalized localities (columns 2–3). This is consistent with
the targeting design of the Progresa intervention discussed above. In addition, as expected
by the village-level random program assignment among the evaluation localities, there are
virtually no differences in the density of the program between neighborhoods with treated
or control centroids (columns 4–5).
Moreover, basic education and health infrastructures serve areas that comprise several
neighboring villages. For instance, only 14 percent of the villages in the evaluation sample
have a health clinic. Yet, 68 percent have access to such a facility within 5 km. Similarly, most
localities do not have a junior secondary school – only 17 percent do in the evaluation sample
– while 93 percent have access to one or more in other villages within 5 km. Hence, households
from different program localities located in the same area can interact when utilizing social
infrastructure. Furthermore, some operations which are specific to the program are also
organized in conjunction for several neighboring villages. This is notably the case of the
distribution of transfers in temporary and mobile outposts – located in hub localities –
which serve an additional function to assist beneficiaries and disseminate information on the
program. Hence, program beneficiaries from different neighboring villages can interact in a
number of places.
7Evaluation villages tend to be less populated than non-evaluation villages (average total population
in the two groups is 258 and 338, respectively) while the marginalization index is on average very similar
(4.66 vs. 4.72, respectively). Accordingly, there are on average slightly more scholarship recipients in non-
evaluation villages (49.2) than in evaluation villages (34.5).
9
2.4 Sample Description
We combine the geo-referenced locality data mentioned above with three of the five rounds
of the evaluation survey, collected in October 1997 (from the baseline targeting ENCASEH
survey), October 1998 (second round of the ENCEL evaluation surveys), and November 1999
(fourth round of the ENCEL surveys).8 The resulting dataset contains detailed information
on the outcomes of children and socioeconomic characteristics of a panel of households that
reside in the evaluation localities.
The evaluation survey was intended to cover all the inhabitants of the localities under
study. However, a small share of the population was not interviewed at baseline, and there
were some changes in the village populations, so the total number of households observed in
the data is 24,077 in October 1997, 25,846 in October 1998, and 26,972 in November 1999.
Some attrition occurred, due in part to migration out of the villages, and in part to errors in
identification codes that occurred for a few enumerators: 8.4 percent of the 1997 households
cannot be followed and matched in all three rounds of the survey. Yet, this is unrelated to
the treatment assignment.
At baseline (October 1997), 60 percent of the households in evaluation localities were
classified as eligible to receive program benefits. In this paper, we study the schooling de-
cisions of the children of those eligible households.9 Our main outcome of interest is school
enrollment, for which we also use the term “school participation” interchangeably. It is the
answer to the question Does the child currently attend school? which tracks information
regarding both enrollment and overall attendance in school (but not regular attendance).
Primary school enrollment is almost universal in rural Mexico, while secondary school en-
rollment is the most problematic area for school attainment and also the grade levels where
Progresa has had its greatest impact among eligible children (Schultz (2004)). We thus re-
strict our attention to the enrollment decisions of children who, at baseline, are aged less
than 18 and have either completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school or the first grade of
secondary school.10 We also restrict to a balanced panel of children observed at all rounds.
The sample contains 6,690 children who are making the transition from primary to sec-
ondary school, remaining in secondary or dropping out of school during the academic years
1998–1999 and 1999–2000. For 807 (12.6 percent) of those, no information was collected on
8We have discarded the March 1998 and June 1999 rounds of the survey because we only have information
on the roll-out of the program at the end of each year.
9About 12 percent of the households were classified as non-poor at baseline but were later reclassified as
eligible. To avoid arbitrary classifications, we exclude those households from our analysis.
10The sample selection cannot be based on the grade during the follow-up period because that grade is
potentially affected by the treatment.
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either school participation or parental education, thereby leaving us with a final sample of
5,883 children observed in both 1998 and 1999. At baseline, the average enrollment rate is
63.8 percent (59.3 percent for girls and 68.5 percent for boys).
3 Program Externalities Across Villages
3.1 Empirical Strategy
Our identification strategy exploits two features of the program evaluation design: the prox-
imity between many evaluation villages and village-level random assignment to treatment.
Its key intuition is that, after conditioning on the number of neighboring evaluation local-
ities, the parceling of those assigned to the treatment and control groups is random. This
enables us to identify the effects of the variations in the density of the treatment, induced by
the randomized evaluation, on schooling decisions at any given distance from each village.
Again, neighborhoods are defined as concentric circles around each evaluation village
using geodesic distances d as the radius.11 Program treatment Tj is administered at the
village level. It is randomly assigned only within the subset of 506 villages which participated
to the evaluation of the program, so that not all beneficiary villages participated to the
evaluation. Let then NBj,d,t = N
T
j,d,t + N
NE
j,d,t denote the total number of program beneficiary
villages situated at distance d from evaluation village j in a given post-treatment period
t. Among those, NTj,d,t is the number of evaluation villages which are randomly assigned
to the treatment group of the evaluation and NNEj,d,t the number of other neighboring (non-
evaluation) villages which are targeted by the intervention during each post-treatment period
t. Now let NPj,d,t = N
T
j,d,t + N
C
j,d,t + N
NE
j,d,t denote the number of potential program villages
situated at distance d from village j in a given post-treatment period t, where we have added
NCj,d,t, the number of villages assigned to the control group of the evaluation.
As an alternative measure of program density, we use the numbers of households in
neighboring villages receiving the food stipends. This definition takes into account the
process of program targeting within villages and hence provides a more accurate measure
of local treatment density and the extent of potential interactions with beneficiaries in the
neighborhood. As the take-up of the food component of the program is virtually complete
(reaching 97–98 percent), this variable is not endogenous to externalities that affect school
11Due to data limitation, we do not take into account the local geography (natural obstacles or communi-
cation axes such as mountains, rivers, or valleys) or transportation networks. This restriction can potentially
introduce some measurement error in neighborhood characteristics and generate some attenuation biases in
our estimates.
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participation.
To estimate the effects of spatial externalities on school participation, we use the following
linear regression model:
Yi,j,t = α1Tj + α2N
B
j,d,t + α3N
P
j,d,t + α
′
4Xi,j,d + ǫi,j,d,t, (1)
where Yi,j,t is a dummy indicating that program-eligible child i in evaluation village j in
a given post-treatment period t is going to school, Tj is the randomly assigned treatment
indicator which denotes whether locality j receives the program, Xi,j,d is a column-vector
of baseline characteristics at the individual, household, village and neighborhood level, and
ǫi,j,d,t captures other unobservable determinants of the school participation decision which
are potentially correlated with the program’s targeting.
In this framework, the parameter α1 captures the sum of the average direct effect of
program eligibility and the average indirect effects which stem from treatment of other
individuals in the same village. Due to the fact that program treatment status varies at the
village level, it is not possible to separately identify these two effects.12 The main parameter
of interest is α2, which captures the marginal effect of treatment of one additional village
(or eligible households) in the neighborhood. Finally, the parameter α3 captures the effects
of any unobserved determinant of the school participation decision which is correlated with
the program geographic targeting.
The identification challenge is that more marginalized regions tend to have higher treat-
ment density (see Table 1), and there are a variety of other unobserved factors associated with
the geographic roll-out of the intervention which are also likely to affect program outcomes.
The random program assignment within the subset of evaluation villages provides some
exogenous variation for the local density of treatment in the neighborhood of a subset of
evaluation villages, the ones that have other evaluation villages nearby. More specifically,
conditional on NPj,d,t, cross-neighborhood variations in the local density of the program are
solely determined by the random allocation to the treatment and control groups, and they
are thus orthogonal to any determinant of individual outcomes. Hence, conditionally on
the targeted treatment density in the neighborhood NPj,d,t, the potential schooling outcomes
of child i with treatment T = 0, 1 (in village j at time t) yTi,j,t are independent of actual
12A partial population approach, exploiting the presence of ineligible households in beneficiary villages,
can be followed, and it has been by previous studies. It however requires some assumptions, notably that
spillovers affect both eligible and ineligible individuals, and is thus not well-suited for investigating spillovers
on the take-up of program components.
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treatment density NBj,d,t
E[yi,j,t|N
B
j,d,t, N
P
j,d,t] = E[yi,j,t|N
P
j,d,t]. (2)
Moreover this conditional independence assumption holds whatever the treatment status Tj
of village j.
A few remarks are in order. First, as program targeting is partly correlated with local
poverty, we expect the estimate of α3 to be biased downward. However, the bias on that
parameter is orthogonal to both the Tj and N
B
j,d,t terms and hence it does not contaminate
the estimates of the α1 and α2 parameters. Second, as already mentioned, the parameter
α2 is estimated for the set of eligible households of the controlled experiment which have
other evaluation villages in the neighborhood of radius d. Third, this parameter captures
the effects of neighboring evaluation villages that are randomly assigned to the program. It
does not necessarily extend to other program beneficiary localities which are located nearby
the villages in our sample.
As a validation test of the condition (2), we use data from the baseline collected in October
1997 on children’s school participation as well as the full set of covariates that we employ
in the empirical analysis, and estimate equation (1) using those baseline characteristics as
outcomes. Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for those variables (columns
1–2) along with the associated OLS coefficients of the neighborhood treatment density term
(NBj,t). In column 3, we display the unconditional marginal effects which reveal the presence
of systematic differences in observable characteristics across neighborhoods with different
degrees of program density. Consistently with the targeting design of the program, treatment
density correlates positively both with the level of deprivation in the centroid village and with
the density of villages/population in the neighborhood. However, as reported in column 4,
those differences tend to fade out once we further control for the potential treatment density
in the neighborhood (NPj,t).
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The inclusion of the controls Xi,j,d in equation (1) is meant to increase the precision
of the estimates. The controls are all measured at baseline using the 1997 data to avoid
any endogeneity concern and, taking advantage of the panel dimension of the data, include
in particular baseline school enrollment Yi,j,t0=1997. The remaining controls are for: child’s
gender and age (both in levels and squares), parental education, distance to the nearest city,
the share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality, total
13Two of those baseline variables (the share of eligible households and the number of secondary schools)
remain marginally statistically associated (at the 10 percent confidence level) with the density of the program.
For consistency with our main estimates we estimate those placebo regressions using a 5 km radius (d = 5).
Results (available upon request) are very similar when considering alternative radiuses.
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population in the locality, the number of localities, total population and the mean degree of
marginalization in the neighborhood. We also control for state and time dummies.
To account for the fact that evaluation villages may belong to multiple neighborhoods,
we cluster standard errors for groups of partially overlapping neighborhoods. Those groups
are defined as sets of evaluation villages such that each village lies within the radius-based
neighborhood of another village of the set. Intuitively, as soon as an evaluation village
belongs to two radius-based neighborhoods, those two neighborhoods will belong to the
same cluster. This allows for correlations beyond single radiuses. In the empirical analysis,
our preferred specification uses a 5 km radius but we also use radiuses of 10 and 20 km.
Considering a larger radius leads to a smaller number of clusters. In particular, the 506
villages in the experiment belong to 358 clusters of partially overlapping 5 km neighborhoods
– the 320 treatment villages belong to 249 such clusters – and this number reduces to 180
when considering clusters formed by overlapping 10 km neighborhoods, and 45 with 20 km
ones.
The next step is to investigate whether spatial externalities arise from interactions that
involve only program beneficiaries or from more general externalities of treatment density,
such as social interactions within preexisting networks (e.g., extended families), or changes
in local markets (e.g., access to credit) and in the supply of public goods (e.g., learning
conditions in local schools). We argue that, while such general externalities are likely to affect
households and children of both treatment and control localities, indirect effects restricted to
treatment villages and eligible households should reveal interactions between beneficiaries.
In equation (1), local treatment density is orthogonal to village-level treatment, so that
the indirect effect of the program can be identified for both treatment and control group
villages. This feature of our empirical framework allows us to disentangle whether spatial
externalities extend to the entire population or affect exclusively the outcomes of children
and families who are included in the program. We thus consider the following variant of
equation (1):
Yi,j,t = β1Tj + β2N
B
j,d,t + β3[Tj ×N
B
j,d,t] + β4N
p
j,d,t + β5[Tj ×N
P
j,d,t] +Xi,j,d,t0β6 + ui,j,d,t, (3)
where the village-level treatment assignment term (Tj) is interacted with the density of both
actual (NBj,d,t) and potential (N
P
j,d,t) neighboring beneficiary localities so that the effects of
cross-village externalities are identified separately for the control and treatment groups. This
specification allows to test whether program externalities differentially vary with treatment
assignment (β3 6= 0).
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3.2 Empirical Evidence
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of the model in equation (1) for the effects of spatial
spillovers of the program on eligible children’s school participation decisions. The estimates
are obtained using the data for the post-treatment period (October 1998 and November
1999). We report only the estimates of the parameters α1 and α2, but, as discussed above,
the regressions control for baseline characteristics observed in October 1997, notably baseline
school enrollment. The estimates are obtained with two alternative measures of program
density in neighborhoods of evaluation villages: the models in columns 1–3 use the numbers
of villages treated in a 5 km radius, while the ones in columns 4–6 use instead the numbers
of eligible households within the same radius. Columns 1 and 4 report the estimates for
the baseline model in equation (1). In order to document the heterogeneity of cross-village
externalities by treatment status, columns 2 and 5 report OLS estimates of the augmented
model specified in equation (3) and columns 3 and 6 estimates of the model in equation (1)
obtained after restricting the sample to the treatment group.14
Beginning with the results obtained when measuring program density by the numbers of
villages, column 1 indicates that, when considering the entire sample of children in treatment
and control villages, while living in a treated community increases school participation by 9.5
percentage points, having an additional treated village within a 5 km radius further increases
enrollment rates by 2.7 percentage points (this spillover effect is statistically significant at
10 percent). The former own-village treatment effect is in line with the results obtained
in previous studies (e.g. Schultz (2004)). Program externalities appear to matter only
for children who live in treatment group localities. Column 2 indeed shows no evidence
of spillovers affecting school enrollment of children in control villages (the parameter for
the main effect of program density has a negative point estimate and it is not statistically
significant), but evidence of strong spillovers on the treatment group. The point estimate
for the differential effect of spillovers in treatment villages as compared to control villages
(given by the parameter for the interaction term β3 in equation (3)) reaches 7.8 percentage
points, and this estimated differential effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.15
Note that, when we introduce the effects of spatial spillovers, the relative OLS coefficient of
the village-level treatment assignment term (β1) decreases to 8 percentage points, thereby
revealing that a small part of the program effects are partly driven by differential cross-village
14We also ran probit estimates of the same models and obtained very similar estimates of the effects of
spillovers – the results are available upon request.
15We tested for non-linear effects of spillovers in the control villages but found no evidence of such effects
(the corresponding estimates are available from the authors).
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externalities in the treatment group. The finding of spillovers restricted to the control group
is confirmed by the estimates in column 3, on the sample to the treatment group: the effect
on school enrollment of having an additional treated village within a 5 km radius is estimated
at 5.8 percentage points, and it is again statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The specifications which use the numbers of eligible households for measuring program
density give similar results. The numbers of eligible households (in beneficiary, evaluation
and treatment villages), the main explanatory variables, are normalized by 100. Column
4 of Table 3 indicates that having an additional 100 of such eligible households in a 5
km radius increases school participation by 4.1 percentage points (and again this result is
statistically significant at 10 percent). Columns 5 and 6 confirm the finding of spillovers
affecting exclusively children in treatment villages. When restricting to that sample, an
additional hundred eligible households in the neighborhood is estimated to increase school
participation by 7.8 percentage points and this effect is statistically significant at 5 percent.
In order to better gauge the magnitude of the spillovers we estimated, note that treatment
group villages have in average .4 other treatment group villages in a 5 km radius, and so the
5.8 percentage point spillover effect reported in column 3 of Table 3 translates into an average
spillover effect of about 2.4 percentage points increase in secondary-school enrollment. This
roughly corresponds to one fourth of the direct effect of the program. Similarly, the treatment
group sample has in average 17.9 other eligible families in neighboring treatment villages,
so that extrapolating the 7.8 percentage point estimate of spillovers per hundred eligible
households (in column 6 of Table 3) leads to a 1.4 percentage point increase in secondary
school participation.
Extrapolating the marginal effects we identified to the total number of beneficiary vil-
lages or eligible households in the neighborhoods of evaluation villages would indicate an
implausibly large effect of more than 50 percentage points. One should be careful, though,
when interpreting those results as our estimates exploit the variations generated by the ran-
domized evaluation, so in principle they cannot be extrapolated to recover the total spillover
effects generated by the entire set of program beneficiaries in the neighborhood. Although
we don’t have evidence of this, it is possible that program participants in neighboring evalua-
tion villages interacted more or in different ways than those in other neighboring beneficiary
villages.
For investigating whether spillovers operate over relatively short or larger distances, Table
4 reports the OLS estimates of the model in equation (1) using measures of program density
in neighborhoods covering larger distances than 5 km around. Those estimates are also
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obtained using the two measures of program density, the numbers of villages (columns 1–4)
and eligible households (columns 5–8). Columns 1 and 5 use the same baseline specification as
columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 with the entire sample. Columns 2 and 6 use the restricted sample
of children in treated villages (as columns 3 and 6 of Table 3). For the estimates in columns
3, 4, 7 and 8, we measure program density over a 20 km radius and weight the observations
in each village by the inverse of the distance to the centroid. Now, as those are defined as
the set of villages within a given distance to at least another village in the set, the number
of clusters decreases in those estimates as we increase the size of the neighborhoods: with 10
km radiuses, we have 180 clusters for the entire sample and 137 for the sample of treatment
villages, and with 20 km radiuses the numbers of clusters fall to 45 and 36. Otherwise, these
specifications are estimated using the same data and include the same control variables as
the ones in Table 3. The estimated coefficient for the numbers of treated villages located
at a distance between 5 and 10 km is small and statistically insignificant. This suggests the
presence of a strong decay rate in spatial externalities. However, the specifications using the
distance-weighted density measures computed over the 20 km radius confirm the presence of
positive spillovers on school participation in treatment group localities. The estimates are
statistically significant at 5 percent level, consistently with the results presented in Table 3.
Overall, these results indicate that spillovers operate over relatively short distances. Since we
find no evidence of spillovers of beneficiaries over larger distances, in the rest of the analysis
we restrict to those operating over 0 to 5 km.
4 Further Evidence
We now use additional information gathered from both program operational surveys and
administrative sources in order to shed some light on the interpretation behind the patterns
uncovered in Section 3. The finding of spillovers on school enrollment operating over short
distances supports a simple model of peer effects on program take-up decisions of eligible
households.16 As we don’t have measures of the occurrences of interactions of beneficiaries
from different neighboring villages, we cannot report direct evidence of this. We hence
conduct several indirect checks for the presence of such interactions. On the other hand,
some spatial variations in the local implementation of the program could also a priori explain
the observed relationship between the local density of the treatment and program impacts.
16Non-market interactions may affect take-up decisions through two channels: information and social
norms. While conceptually different, those two forms of social behaviors can hardly be distinguished empir-
ically. We thus broadly refer to the influence of others on individual responses as peer effects.
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We also test for the presence of such spatial variations in implementation.
4.1 Peer Effects among Program Participants
In spite of the emphasis placed on informing the potential participants about the objectives,
design and requirements of the intervention, concerns have been expressed by those involved
in the initial phases of the implementation regarding the effectiveness of the diffusion of
information about the program among targeted households (Adato et al., 2000). To further
corroborate this anecdotal evidence, we use information from an operational follow-up survey
conducted among eligible households in the evaluation treatment-group villages in May 1999
(i.e., 14 months after the inception of the program). Program beneficiaries were asked to
identify three sets of benefits distributed by Progresa: (i) scholarships and school supplies, (ii)
food stipends and nutritional supplements, and (iii) preventive health care and health check-
ups. Most of the respondents were the mothers who were to receive the transfers. While 98
percent of the respondents were able to spontaneously and correctly mention the nutrition
component, only 60 percent correctly identified both the health and education components.
Knowledge of the program components was thus incomplete in treatment villages at that
time.
In such a context of sparse and coarse knowledge about the benefits of the intervention,
information-sharing among potential beneficiaries is likely to have played a role, notably
among women who are the primary recipients of the transfers and regularly encounter each
other during program operations. When asked, in the same operational follow-up survey, to
mention the most significant changes in their communities, half of the beneficiaries report
that the program had increased the degree of cooperation among women.
For further evidence on this, we estimate the effects of spatial spillovers on those measures
of eligible households’ knowledge of the different program components. Table 5 reports the
estimates, which are obtained using the model in equation (1) estimated on the October
1998 data. Having one additional neighboring program village increases by respectively 4.5
and 8.2 percentage points the shares of eligible households who are aware of the education
and health components (column 1 and 2), but has no significant effects on the share of those
aware of the nutritional component (column 3). This suggests that spatial spillovers result
in a better knowledge of the educational and health components.
Given the evidence of program externalities on school participation decisions presented in
Section 3, the variations of the knowledge of the education component could reflect increases
in school attendance rather than the presence of peer effects among potential beneficiaries.
18
Yet, the observed increase in the knowledge indicators of the other program components
(such as health benefits) makes it difficult to interpret this evidence as purely stemming
from corresponding variations in school enrollment among program-eligible children.
To further test the presence of social interactions, we then examine the heterogeneities
in the effects of program density associated with belonging to specific social networks of
individuals living in the same areas. More specifically, we examine whether spatial spillovers
are stronger within networks of households from the same ethnolinguistic groups. For this
purpose, we define a proxy of ethnic affiliation according to whether or not the household
head speaks only an indigenous language, and construct the relative shares of indigenous
and non-indigenous program-eligible households in nearby villages. Columns 4–6 of Table 5
report evidence of such heterogeneity in the effects of spillovers on the knowledge of the health
and nutrition components associated with those ethnolinguistic groups at the neighborhood
level.17
The results reported in Table 5 provide suggestive evidence that social interactions and
information-sharing on the program components, among eligible households, are driving
at least partially the spatial spillovers we observe. Spatial spillovers are associated with
improved knowledge of the components of the program, and those effects increase when the
other beneficiaries in neighboring villages belong to the same linguistic groups, a factor that
should facilitate social interactions.
4.2 Supply-side Effects
Areas with higher densities of program participants might have benefited from more efficient
program operations, or from improvements in the supply of education or health services,
thereby helping some eligible households to comply with the schooling requirements of the
program. A related alternative explanation is that the implementation of the program may
have been more efficient when the number of evaluation treatment group villages in the
neighborhood (rather than the total number of beneficiaries) was higher. While both notions
of implementation scale gains seem a priori reasonable, we argue that they are unlikely to
explain our results.
To examine the presence of differences in implementation and supply, two preliminary
points should be noted. First, any variation in program delivery in a given geographic area
should benefit evenly those program recipients who reside in it. This is at odds with the
17In our sample, 7.3 percent of households are reported being indigenous. We don’t have information on
the specific indigenous group to which each household belongs to and hence this measure is clearly a coarse
indicator of ethnic affiliation.
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evidence reported in column 1 of Table 3, that program externalities appear spatially con-
centrated within relatively small areas surrounding the evaluation villages. According to this
line of thought, supply changes would likely affect the enrollment decisions of both recipients
and non-recipients, an idea difficult to reconcile with the evidence of heterogeneous exter-
nalities reported in column 2 of Table 3. Similarly, if cross-village externalities were driven
by supply-side factors, we should not observe any systematic difference across characteris-
tics that are predictors of social interactions among potential participants without altering
the local scale of the program. Yet, the evidence presented above (see Table 5) suggests
that cross-village externalities appear to vary according to the ethnic composition of village
neighborhoods. These arguments apply to implementation variations that could be either
associated with the density of all beneficiaries or treatment density within the evaluation
sample.
Second, we identify spatial spillovers using only the variation in program density gener-
ated by the randomized experiment. This variation is small compared to the overall scale of
the program (as seen in Table 1, in a given 5 km radius there are on average 10 beneficiary vil-
lages, but only 0.6 evaluation villages, among which 0.4 are assigned to the treatment group
and 0.2 to the control group). Program density is thus not very different around villages
which have more treatment-group villages than around those which have more control-group
villages in their neighborhood, and the resulting infra-marginal changes in the scale of the
program are unlikely to trigger any supply-side efficiency gain.
We next run a battery of complementary tests aimed at detecting the presence of supply-
side responses associated with experimental variations in the density of treatment in the
areas surrounding evaluation villages. We begin with measures of implementation efficiency.
According to qualitative interviews with beneficiaries, local program staff, school teachers
and health staff (see Adato et al., 2000), one major source of inefficiency in program de-
livery was the observed delays in the delivery of the form for school attendance monitoring
(E1 form) and the associated delays in the payment of scholarships. We use program ad-
ministrative data on the monetary transfers delivered to eligible households to compute the
number of months since incorporation after which the first disbursements were made to the
localities assigned to the treatment group. While food stipends were distributed to all vil-
lages assigned to the treatment group at the same time in March 1998, only 56 percent of
the those localities received the first scholarship transfer in March 1998; 36 percent received
them two months later, and the remaining 8 percent six months or more after incorporation
into the program. Furthermore, we use information from the operational follow-up survey
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on whether program recipients received the E1 form or not. As of May 1999, 24 percent
of beneficiaries report not having received it. The effects of treatment density are obtained
using the baseline model of equation 1 for the sample of both treatment and control villages.
As documented in columns 1–3 of Table 6, this variation in program implementation seems
unrelated to our measure of treatment density in the areas surrounding evaluation villages.18
We then turn to the provision of local health and education services. The funding of
those services is independent of the program’s budget: funds are transferred from the federal
government to local municipalities through separate channels.19 We directly test for the
presence of any effects of treatment density on the delivery of education services. Columns
4–5 of Table 6 display the resulting estimates, obtained using the same model and sample
as before, for the relative density of schools and teachers located within 5 km from each
evaluation village during the post-intervention period (1998–1999). None of those factors
seem related to our measure of treatment density.
We can then run one further indirect test. Because of the constraints due to the coor-
dination of the program supply-side responses among several municipalities, the supply of
education and health services should vary less with local treatment density in the neigh-
borhood when it extends over several municipalities. Hence, if present, the effects of local
supply improvements should be weaker in areas that cross municipalities. To check this, we
split village neighborhoods according to whether or not they cross some municipal boundary,
and estimate treatment externalities on school participation in the two cases. As shown in
column 6 of Table 6, the program externalities do not seem to vary systematically along
this dimension. If anything, they seem larger for those village neighborhoods which share
an administrative border – although the difference between the two OLS coefficients is not
statistically significant.
While each piece of evidence presented above may not be sufficient to rule out the presence
of the effects of program implementation or the supply of social services, together they make
it difficult to interpret our findings as solely driven by such variations.
18Those administrative delays appear concentrated in some regions, and notably in the States of Queretaro
and San Luis Potosi. As a further check, we have re-estimated equation 1 without those two states. Results
(available upon request) are very similar to those reported in Table 3.
19The federal government also provides health services in marginalized rural communities though the
Social Security Institute (IMSS). Yet, the bulk of educational and health services are provided by local
governments (Levy, 2006).
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5 Conclusion
We have examined the Progresa-Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program to see
whether take-up of one aspect of the program is influenced by the presence of other bene-
ficiaries in areas comprising several villages. We found evidence of large positive spillovers
within networks of beneficiaries spanning those areas. Higher local densities of program
beneficiaries increase the take up of the scholarships for secondary schooling offered by the
program and, accordingly, school enrollment at that level. In contrast, these effects do not
affect the schooling decisions of households in the control group villages that were not yet
incorporated to the program.
Our estimates indicate that the effect of an additional treatment group village in a 5
km neighborhood is to increase by 5.8 percentage points secondary school enrollment of
program-eligible children in treated villages, which compares to a direct effect of own-village
treatment of 9.5 percentage points. These findings suggest the presence of neighborhood
effects on the take-up of the schooling component by households who already benefit some
component of the program, notably the cash transfers for food.
To better understand our findings, we tested and found suggestive evidence for the pres-
ence of information-sharing among program-eligible households. While we could not directly
test for the presence of social interactions, we found that higher treatment densities in the
areas are associated with increased knowledge among eligible households about the schooling
and health components of the program. We also found that spillovers occur predominantly
within neighborhood-level networks of beneficiaries that are homogeneous in ethnic com-
position, a factor that facilitates cross-village interactions. We also tested the alternative
hypothesis that the effects we captured reflect heterogeneities in direct treatment impacts
due to spatial variations in the implementation of the program. The evidence that we have
presented tends to reject this explanation.
Neighborhood effects on program take-up have implications for the design and implemen-
tation of social policies in developing countries. The power of the effect suggests that there
can be large gains from the spatial concentration of an intervention’s target population, as
local networks of potential beneficiaries can accelerate the take-up of the proposed benefits.
Neighborhood effects also have implications for the evaluation of social policy interventions,
notably in settings where a program is implemented over an extended area and treatment
density is high. In particular, capturing those effects across villages so as to recover impact
evaluation parameters that incorporate spillovers, will require analyzing the impacts of the
program at the level of relatively large geographical areas. Of course, the feasibility of that
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option will depend on the scale of the program that is being evaluated, and statistical power
needs to be controlled as well. These considerations will be important in particular for eval-
uations conducted as the interventions are being scaled up on a large scale, a setting which
differs from the evaluation of small pilot programs.
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Figure 1: Program Coverage (1998-1999)
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0 240 480120 Kilometers
0 10 205 Kilometers
Legend
! Evaluation locality assigned to treatment 
! Evaluation locality assigned to control
! Other program locality 1999
! Other program locality 1998
Note: This map reports the geographic locations of the villages targeted by the program during the period
1998-1999 in the seven central States of Mexico in which the evaluation of the program took place. The
quadrant in the up-right corner displays a close-up view of a region in the State of Michoacan in which the
size of the markers has been adjusted for the relative population size and 5km radiuses are displayed around
each evaluation village.
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Table 1: Treatment Density in Neighborhood around Evaluation Villages
Neighborhood Poverty Treat Assignment
Sample All Low High Treat Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Numbers of beneficiaries in neighborhood
# Beneficiary villages 10.0 6.66 13.3 10.2 9.64
(8.13) (5.07) (9.19) (8.20) (8.04)
# Children in beneficiary villages 834 565 1104 831 841
(864) (641) (968) (839) (908)
# Scholarship recipients 386 252 520 385 386
(402) (283) (455) (385) (430)
Distribution of evaluation villages in neighborhood
Prob(1 evaluation village) 0.27 0.24 0.31 0.28 0.26
(0.45) (0.43) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44)
Prob(2 eval. villages) 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.12
(0.32) (0.29) (0.34) (0.31) (0.33)
Prob(3+ eval. villages) 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.06) (0.24) (0.17) (0.18)
Total Villages in Evaluation Sample 506 253 253 320 186
Note: This table reports, using data for October 1998, means and standard deviations (in paren-
thesis) for the numbers of neighboring beneficiary villages, children (aged 6-14) in those villages
and scholarship recipients, and the distribution of neighboring evaluation villages within areas
delimited by 5 kilometers radius around evaluation localities. In columns 2-3 we split the sample
of evaluation localities according to the median of the average index of marginalization in the
neighborhood. In columns 4-5 we spit the sample according to the program treatment assignment
indicator of the village situated in the centroid of each neighborhood.
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Table 2: Baseline Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. OLS Coefficient of Neighborhood
Treatment Density term (N bj,5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
School Enrollment 0.638 0.480 -0.0003 0.0191
(0.0008) (0.0227)
Individual and HH Characteristics
Age 14.53 2.035 0.0009 -0.034
(0.003) (0.061)
Female 0.503 0.500 -0.0007 0.007
(0.0005) (0.012)
Mother Education (years) 2.222 2.249 -0.0189 -0.0104
(0.006)*** (0.137)
Centroid Village Characteristics
Share of Program Eligible HHs 0.591 0.193 0.004 0.037
(0.001)*** (0.020)*
Secondary School (dummy) 0.252 0.434 -0.004 0.014
(0.002)** (0.050)
Distance to Nearest City 104.8 42.84 -0.260 0.907
(0.199) (4.61)
Neighborhood (radius=5km) Characteristics
Number of Secondary Schools 3.018 2.072 0.097 -0.432
(0.013)*** (0.242)*
Mean Index of Marginalization 4.379 0.734 0.013 0.030
(0.003)*** (0.071)
Number of Villages 22.85 13.00 0.554 0.0836
(0.067)*** (1.22)
Population Density (thous) 7050.2 9095.5 0.433 0.22
(0.77)*** (0.67)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations (columns 1-2) of the the school par-
ticipation (enrollment) outcome at baseline (October 1997) as well as the full set of covariates
the we employ in the empirical analysis. In columns 3-4, we display the OLS coefficient of the
neighborhood treatment density term (radius=5km) on each of those baseline characteristics,
respectively without and with its potential counterpart as a conditioning term. Standard er-
rors clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods are reported in
parenthesis below each OLS coefficients.
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Table 3: Spatial Externalities of the Program on School Enrollment
Villages Eligible households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Village Treated .0949*** .0807*** .0935*** .0807***
(.0138) (.0252) (.0139) (.0227)
# Villages treated in 0-5km .0274* -.0196 .0585***
(.0158) (.0233) (.0211)
(# Villages treated in 0-5km)×Treat .0781**
(.0329)
# Eligible HHs treated in 0-5km .0412* -.0257 .0778**
(.0245) (.0418) (.0352)
(# Eligible HHs treated in 0-5km)×Treat .0998*
(.0565)
Baseline enrollment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 11766 11766 7317 11766 11766 7317
R-squared 0.364 0.365 0.383 0.365 0.365 0.384
Number of Clusters 358 358 249 358 358 249
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village externalities on school participation decisions. The depen-
dent variable equals 1 if the child currently attends school. Columns 1-3 use the numbers of villages treated in a
5km radius as a measure of treatment, while columns 4-6 use the numbers of eligible households in the radius. The
sample contains program-eligible children in evaluation villages, observed in October 1998 and November 1999, and
who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of
secondary school. It is restricted to treatment villages in columns 3 and 6. Standard errors are clustered at the level
of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods are reported in parenthesis. All specifications control for baseline
school enrollment. The other control variables include: the potential number of villages (columns 1-3) or scholarship
recipients (columns 4-6) in neighborhood, child’s gender, age and age squared, parental education, distance to the
nearest city, the share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population,
the number of localities, the number of secondary schools and the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state
dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Source: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities and
secondary schools.
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Table 4: Specification Checks
Villages Eligible households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Own Village Treated .0936*** .0956*** .0924*** .0937***
(.0156) (.00925) (.0152) (.00991)
# Villages treated in 0-5km .0254* .0623***
(.0148) (.02)
# Villages treated in 5-10km -.00578 .0136
(.0157) (.0152)
# Villages treated distance-weighted .0289 .0871**
(.025) (.0417)
# Eligible HHs treated in 0-5km .0402* .0784**
(.021) (.0356)
# Eligible HHs treated in 5-10km -.00429 .00755
(.0189) (.0202)
# Eligible HHs treated distance-weigted .0318 .11**
(.0257) (.0432)
Baseline enrollment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 11766 7317 11766 7317 11766 7317 11766 7317
R-squared 0.364 0.384 0.365 0.381 0.365 0.384 0.365 0.380
Number of Clusters 180 137 45 36 180 137 45 36
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village externalities on school participation decisions. The dependent variable equals 1
if the child currently attends school. As measures of treatment, columns 1-4 use the numbers of villages treated, respectively within 5km,
10km, and 20km with distance weights, while columns 5-8 use the numbers of eligible households respectively within 5km, 10km, and
20km with distance weights.The sample contains program-eligible children in evaluation villages, observed in October 1998 and November
1999, and who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of secondary
school. Standard errors are clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods are reported in parenthesis. All
specifications control for baseline school enrollment. The other control variables include: the potential number of villages (columns 1-4)
or eligible households (columns 5-8) in child’s gender age and age squared, parental education, distance to the nearest city, the share
of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population, the number of localities, the number of
secondary schools and the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Source: Progresa
evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities and secondary schools.
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Table 5: Knowledge About the Program Components
Scholarship Health Nutrition Scholarship Health Nutrition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Treated Villages 0-5km .0452** .0817*** .0114
(.0221) (.0285) (.00746)
(Share of Indig. in Treated 0-5km)×Indigenous -.0168 .229** .179*
(.175) (.106) (.1)
(1-Share of Indig. in Treated 0-5km)×Non-indigenous -.133 -.00662 .0074
(.183) (.191) (.0179)
Baseline enrollment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 3858 3858 3858 3858 3858 3858
R-squared .0728 .0534 .0255 .0712 .0534 .0277
Number of Clusters 242 242 242 242 242 242
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village externalities on dichotomous indicators of whether recipients’ know the various
components of the benefits package of the program. Standard errors clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neigh-
borhoods are reported in parenthesis. Sample of program-eligible households residing in treated villages observed in October 1998 whose
children, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of secondary school.
The following baseline control variables are included in each specification: the potential number of villages in 0-5km (columns 1-3) or
the share of program-eligible indigenous households in evaluation villages in 0-5km (columns 4-6), child’s gender age and age squared,
parental education, distance to the nearest city, the share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality;
total population, the number of localities, the number of secondary schools and the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state
dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Source: Progresa evaluation surveys, geo-referenced census of localities and secondary schools, and
Progresa follow-up survey of recipients.
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Table 6: Program Effectiveness
Delays in Transfers Share of Eligibles Number of Neighborhood
Scholarships School supplies E1 form Schools in 0-5km Teachers in 0-5km Spans Municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Treated Villages 0-5km -0.018 -0.048 0.001 0.122 1.413
(0.136) (0.131) (0.023) (0.097) (1.136)
# Treated Villages 0-5km - Same Muni 0.064**
(0.028)
# Treated Villages 0-5km - Diff Muni 0.104***
(0.037)
Sample Mean of Dependent Variable 0.68 0.98 0.81
Number of Obs 612 610 604 618 618 7364
R-squared 0.342 0.112 0.080 0.943 0.955 0.385
Number of Clusters 247 246 243 249 249 249
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village externalities on various measures of program effectiveness in the delivery of public services. Standard
errors clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods are reported in parenthesis. Column 1: sample of program-eligible children
residing in treated villages observed in October 1998 and November 1999 who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary
school and the first grade of secondary school. Columns 2-6: sample of treated villages observed in October 1998 and November 1999. Baseline control variables
include: child’s gender and age, parental education (column 1 only), distance to the nearest city, the share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary
school in the locality; total population, the number of localities, the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998.
Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys, Progresa administrative transfer database, Progresa follow-up survey of recipients and geo-referenced census of localities.
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